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NOTES
STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: ORDINANCES
RESTRICTING THE HOURS OF DOOR-TO-
DOOR SOLICITATION
The first amendment' protects the freedom of speech against legislative
encroachment. Free speech includes the right to advocate beliefs and to
solicit for organizations.2 By exercising the right to speak freely to
homeowners3 at their place of residence, political, religious and other
groups can raise funds from and spread ideas to a community effectively
and inexpensively.4
While homeowners have a right to receive a solicitor's message,5 they
also have a judicially recognized right to privacy.6 Furthermore, local
governments have an interest in protecting homeowners from crime and
annoyance and may regulate the movement of persons through neighbor-
hoods.7 Consequently, the first amendment rights of door-to-door solici-
tors conflict with the privacy interest of homeowners and the security
I. The first amendment provides in part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech ...." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
2. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 633 (1980); Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
3. For the purpose of this Note, "homeowners" include apartment dwellers and property own-
ers. Similarly, "homes" include all places of residence, whether purchased or leased.
4. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-56 (1943); Schneider v. Town of Irving-
ton, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939). Door-to-door solicitation involves a degree of personal interaction
greater than that afforded by other means of communication, such as by mail, telephone, or adver-
tisement. These latter methods reach more people, but in a more passive, unilateral fashion. In
addition, door-to-door solicitation may provide the least expensive method of circulating an organi-
zation's ideas and generating financial support. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146
(1943).
5. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1943); Citizens for a Better Env't v.
Village of Olympia Fields, 511 F. Supp. 104, 107 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
6. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S.
610, 619 (1976); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't., 397 U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949); see also Kamin, Residential Picketing and The First Amendment, 61
Nw. U.L. REV. 177, 182 (1967). Courts frequently express concern that homeowners not become a
"captive audience" for unwanted speech. See Association of Community Organizations for Reform
Now (ACORN) v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1983); see also infra notes 110-12
and accompanying text (discussion of "captive audiences" problem).
7. See, e.g., Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619 (1976).
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interest shared by local governments and homeowners.' This clash of
interests intensifies in the evening, when the solicitor can contact greater
numbers of people and the homeowner and the local government have
greater interests in privacy and security.9
Local governments frequently attempt to preserve homeowner privacy
and security by limiting door-to-door solicitation to specific time periods.
Local ordinances often restrict solicitation to the hours between 9:00
a.m. and 6:00 p.m.10 While restrictions on permissible hours of solicita-
tion advance the interests of homeowner privacy and neighborhood se-
curity, 1 they also limit the solicitor's access to an audience and thus
infringe first amendment rights. 12
The United States Supreme Court has never addressed the constitu-
tionality of ordinances limiting the hours of door-to-door solicitation.
13
The Court has, however, examined regulations prohibiting solicitation,14
8. One commentator observed the conflict of interests between solicitors, homeowners, and
local governments as follows:
Of all the methods of spreading unpopular ideas, this [house-to-house canvassing] seems
the least entitled to extensive protection. The possibilities of persuasion are slight com-
pared with the certainties of annoyance. Great as is the value of exposing citizens to novel
views, home is one place where a man ought to be able to shut himself up in his own ideas
if he desires.
Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 406 (1954); see also Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 153 (1943) (Frankfurther, J., dissenting) (observing that local governments should
regulate door-knocking and bell-ringing by professed peddlers of things or ideas to protect the pri-
vacy interests of homeowners); cf Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839, 2860-61
(1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (addressing concern that solicitors might defraud homeowners);
Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862, 865 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (addressing concern that
criminals may pose as solicitors at night).
9. Federal courts considering the validity of solicitation ordinances have readily accepted that
more people are home during the evening, that people who are home during the evening have a
greater expectation of privacy, that more criminal activity occurs at night, and that a city has a
greater interest in crime prevention during the evening. See, e.g., ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714
F.2d 813, 819 n.9 (8th Cir. 1983); Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862, 865 (N.D. Ga.
1979).
10. An ordinance in Frontenac, Missouri, for example, prohibited solicitation of residential
homes after 6:00 p.m. ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 815 (8th Cir. 1983); see infra
notes 71-74 & 129-31 and accompanying text (discussing ACORN).
11. See ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d at 817 n.5 (citing United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967)).
12. See Weeks, Optimal Times to Contact Sample Households, 44 Pun. OPINION Q. 101, 107
(1980).
13. The Supreme Court had an opportunity to judge the constitutionality of a daylight ordi-
nance in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), but the Court
found the ordinance invalid on other grounds and declined to decide the "hours" issue.
14. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); see also infra notes 54-58 and accom-
panying text (discussing Martin).
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requiring solicitation permits, 5 and placing qualifications on the use of
solicited funds. 16 In these decisions, the Court has balanced the interests
restricted by the ordinance in question against the interests advanced by
the ordinance.' 7 Lower courts have reached inconsistent results in con-
sidering ordinances limiting solicitation to daylight hours."
This Note examines the clash between the interests of door-to-door
solicitors and the interest of homeowners and the community. It con-
cludes that the community's interest in crime prevention and the home-
owner's interest in privacy together outweigh the solicitor's right to reach
an audience after dark.' 9 Consequently, local communities should re-
spect the first amendment rights of homeowners and solicitors to receive
and disseminate information by permitting door-to-door solicitation
before sundown.2 0
I. SOLICITATION IN GENERAL
A. Public Solicitation
First amendment rights occupy a "preferred position" above other
constitutional rights.2 ' Courts impose an exacting standard of proof on
local governments to show that "time, place, and manner" ordinances do
15. See Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); see also infra note 60 and accompany-
ing text (discussing licensing of solicitation permits).
16. See Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984); Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); see also infra note 61 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing use-of-funds qualifications).
17. E.g., Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't., 397 U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970).
18. Compare Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (upholding
ordinance limiting solicitation to daylight hours) and McMurdie v. Doutt, 468 F. Supp. 766 (N.D.
Ohio 1979) (same) with ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1983) (regulation of
solicitation between 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. unnecessarily restrictive, but 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. time
period valid); Pennsylvania Pub. Interest v. York Township, 569 F. Supp. 1398 (M.D. Pa. 1983)
(exceptions granted to some classes of solicitors overly broad); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Village
of Olympia Fields, 511 F. Supp. 104 (N.D. 11. 1980) (daylight ordinance invalid on first amendment
grounds); Connecticut Citizens Action Group v. Town of Southington, 508 F. Supp. 43 (D. Conn.
1980) (exceptions unnecessarily broad); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Village of Elm Grove, 462 F.
Supp. 820 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (ordinance invalid for allowing unlimited discretion in the issuance of
solicitation permits) and Alternatives for Cal. Women, Inc. v. City of Contra Costa, 145 Cal. App.
3d 436, 193 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1983) (exceptions unnecessarily broad).
19. See infra notes 107-35 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
21. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937). Disa-
greement remains as to the consequences of a "preferred position." Compare Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (laws affecting speech are not presumptively invalid)
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not infringe upon the freedom of speech.22 A restriction on the exercise
of free speech in public places must serve legitimate or significant govern-
mental objectives without unduly infringing upon the exercise of first
amendment rights.23 A local ordinance must not regulate the content of
speech and must permit "ample alternative channels" for
communication.24
The Supreme Court has recognized that local governments have a le-
gitimate interest in preserving the peace and public safety. 25 Preserving
the peace includes limiting noise26 and maintaining orderly movement of
people in confined areas.27 The prevention of littering, which often ac-
companies the distribution of handbills, is not a legitimate interest.28
In pursuit of these legitimate ends, local governments may regulate the
"time, place, and manner" of free speech so long as they narrowly draw
the regulation to minimize the degree of intrusiveness.29 In Schneider v.
Town of Irvington,3° the Court ruled that local governments must pro-
vide solicitors with "appropriate places" to solicit.31 The Court has in-
with G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1106 (10th ed. 1980) (any
attempt to abridge first amendment rights is presumptively unconstitional).
22. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980).
23. See id. at 632; ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 816 (8th Cir. 1983); Westfall v.
Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862, 865 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
24. See Hefron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981)
(quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacists v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1978)); Pennsylvania Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Council of the Borough of Munhall, 743 F.2d
182, 187-88 (3d Cir. 1984). "Ample alternative channels" means time and places for solicitation
when persons may exercise their first amendment rights without government interference, See Hef-
fron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 654-55 (1981). Alternative
forums must allow solicitors access to a significant audience. See Members of City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2132-33 (1984). Courts only require that local
governments provide "ample," not necessarily equivalent, alternatives. See infra notes 97-99 & 105-
06 and accompanying text (discussing "ample alternative forums" test).
25. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940). In Cantwell, the Court held that
local governments may regulate the "peace, good order, and comfort of the community." Id. Local
ordinances may not, however, give public officials broad discretionary authority to decide what
speech is proper or improper for accomplishing these objectives. Id.
26. See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117 (1972); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 80
(1949).
27. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 649-61 (1981).
28. See Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939).
29. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
30. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
31. Id. at 163, see Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 US. 640
(1981) (holding that fixed booths at state fairgrounds constitute "appropriate places" for solicita-
tion); infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing Heffron).
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validated ordinances requiring prior written permission to distribute
pamphlets,32 prohibiting the distribution of pamphlets,33 and requiring a
license to solicit funds for a religious organization.34 The Court has held,
however, that in proper circumstances35 governments may prohibit
noise36 and may limit solicitation to fixed locations.37 Furthermore, the
Court has commented that governments may require solicitors to iden-
tify themselves.38
The character of some public places justifies regulations of free speech
that would not be constitutional in other settings. In Grayned v. Rock-
ford,39 the Court characterized schoolgrounds as a "special environ-
ment" necessitating the prohibition of disruptive conduct.' The Court
looked to the nature of the forum and its pattern of normal activities to
determine the permissible degree of intrusion upon first amendment
rights.41 Similarly, in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Con-
sciousness," the Court found that the special nature of state fairgrounds
justified a regulation limiting solicitation to fixed booths.43 While the
Court acknowledged that solicitation from a fixed position is less effective
than solicitation from unfixed positions, the large number of patrons in a
confined area necessitated regulations ensuring normal and orderly
32. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (requirement of solicitation license
constitutes invalid prior restraint).
33. See Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 161-64 (1939) (city's interest in prevent-
ing accumulation of litter does not justify prohibition as less restrictive means are available, such as
punishing those persons who actually litter).
34. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (ordinance granting government officials
discretion to decide whether a group was a religious organization qualifying for a solicitation license
constituted an invalid prior restraint).
35. The validity of noise and place regulations depends upon whether they apply only to "spe-
cial environments" or to "appropriate places." See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
36. See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117 (1972) (schoolgrounds are a "special environ-
ment" justifying prohibition of noisy picketing (manner) in front of school (place) during school
hours (time)); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 80 (1949) (intrusion of the noise of sound amplifica-
tion trucks into homes justifies regulation).
37. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 649-51 (1981)
(state fairgrounds and large crowds justified regulation limiting solicitation to fixed booths).
38. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940); see also American Cancer Soc'y v.
City of Dayton, 160 Ohio St. 114, 124, 114 N.E.2d 219, 224 (1953).
39. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
40. Id. at 116-17; cf Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding regulation of "loud and
raucous" noises on public streets). For a discussion of Kovacs, see infra notes 45-49 and accompany-
ing text.
41. 408 U.S. at 116-17.
42. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
43. Id. at 648-51.
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movementa 4
B. Private Solicitation
The Court is less deferential in examining ordinances regulating public
exercises of free speech that affect the privacy interests of homeowners.
In Kovacs v. Cooper,45 the Court upheld a local ordinance prohibiting
"loud and raucous" noises.46 The Court recognized that a homeowner's
privacy interest includes the right to be free from invasive speech 47 and
held that the solicitor's interest in reaching people cheaply and easily
from a sound amplification truck did not outweigh the local govern-
ment's interest in restricting the volume of sound or the time of use.48
The Court noted that less intrusive means of communication are avail-
able to solicitors.49
More recently, the Court demonstrated that the homeowner's interest
in avoiding unwanted communication while in his home outweighs the
solicitor's interest in free speech. In Rowan v. United States Post Office
Department,5" the Court held that the delivery of unwanted mail was a
sufficient invasion of privacy to justify a statute permitting homeowners
to remove their names from mailing lists.5" The Court balanced the
44. Id. The ordinance in Heffron did not regulate the content of the solicitor's speech because
all organizations were subject to its provisions. Id. at 648-49. The regulation served a significant
governmental interest by promoting orderly movement of the crowd through the fair. Id. at 649-50.
In addition, the regulation permitted "ample alternative channels for communication" in the booths,
outside the fairgrounds, and through nonsoliciting communications on the fairgrounds. Id. at 654-
55. Thus, the regulation met the standard of Virginia Pharmacy Board. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text (ordinance must not regulate speech content and must permit "ample alternative
channels for communication").
45. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
46. Id. at 80.
47. Id. at 85-87. The Court observed that "[the unwilling listener. . . is practically helpless to
escape this interference with his privacy. . . except through the protection of the municipality." Id.
at 86-87; see also Public Utilities Comm'n. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467-69 (1981) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (applying "no escape" rationale to passengers on public buses "forced" to listen to
music).
48. 336 U.S. at 88-89; see also Reeves v. McConn, 631 F.2d 377, 384-85 (5th Cir. 1980) (sound
amplification may be incompatible with the normal activity of a residential area at 9:00 p.m. or on a
Sunday morning); cf. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to be Spoken To?, 67 Nw.
U.L. REv. 153, 182 (1972) (invasive speech is too audible to ignore).
49. 336 U.S. at 89. The Court noted that reasonable alternatives include communication by
human voice, by newspapers, or by pamphlets. Id. Cf., e.g., Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308
U.S. 147, 161-64 (1939) (example of Court's usual focus on less intrusive means of regulation).
50. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
51. Id. at 737-38. The statute provided that any person receiving prurient material by mail
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sender's right to communicate against the homeowner's privacy interest
and found that freedom of speech does not include the right to force
communication upon an unwilling recipientby mailing it to his home. 2
While mailed information intuitively seems less intrusive than noise
from a sound amplification truck, the Supreme Court treated the two
situations similarly, focusing upon the homeowner's right not to receive
information in his home against his will. Kovacs and Rowan are distin-
guishable, however, because the regulation in Kovacs did not afford the
homeowner the degree of choice to receive the solictor's message that
was present in the regulation in Rowan. 3
II. SOLICITATION AT THE HOMEOWNER'S DOOR
A. Regulation in General
The Supreme Court has considered various regulations of door-to-door
solicitation other than those regarding hours and has always ruled in
favor of the solicitors. The Court's opinions, however, reflect a concern
that local governments remain able to protect the privacy and security of
homeowners.
In Martin v. City of Struthers,4 the Court invalidated a local ordi-
nance prohibiting all door-to-door solicitation." Although the Court rec-
ognized the government's power to enact time, place, and manner
regulations, 6 it found a complete prohibition too broad. The Court
emphasized that a local government's interest in preserving the privacy
of homeowners does not justify a regulation preventing homeowners
from choosing to receive information from solicitors.58
could request the Postmaster General to order the sender to refrain from future mailings. See 39
U.S.C. § 4009 (Supp. IV 1964) (current version at 39 U.S.C. § 3008 (1982)).
52. 397 U.S. at 737-38. In particular, the Court could find "no basis for according the printed
word or pictures a different or more preferred status because they are sent by mail." Id.
53. The regulation in Kovacs did not provide the homeowner with any choice, as it prohibited
"loud and raucous" sound amplification trucks. The regulation in Rowan, in contrast, permitted the
homeowner to remove his name from mailing lists. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text
(discussing Kovacs and Rowan). Arguably, the degree of regulation in each case was as narrow as
possible, given the intrusive nature of loud noise and the relatively minor annoyance of unwanted
mail.
54. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
55. Id. at 146-49.
56. Id. at 148 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940)).
57. Id. at 147-49.
58. Id. at 146-47; see also Citizens for a Better Env't v. Village of Olympia Fields, 511 F. Supp.
104, 107 (N.D. I11. 980) (city's interest in preventing undue annoyance of its citizens does not justify
Number 1)
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Local governments must draw regulations restricting door-to-door so-
licitation with such "narrow specificity" as to minimize intrusion into
first amendment rights.59 The Court accordingly has invalidated ordi-
nances that give licensing officers unlimited discretion to grant or deny
solicitation permits6" or condition solicitation on the financial status of
the applicant and the cost of solicitation. 61 Furthermore, local regulation
of door-to-door solicitation must serve important governmental inter-
ests. 62 The Court has indicated that the preservation of homeowner pri-
vacy 63 and the prevention of crime 4 are governmental interests justifying
regulation that subordinates the rights of homeowners who may be "willing recipients" of the solici-
tor's message).
59. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
60. See Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976). The Hynes Court invalidated the
ordinance as unconstitutionally vague, finding that it did not provide any standards to determine
what groups came within stated exceptions or what information was necessary for the issuance of a
permit. Id. at 620-22; see also American Cancer Soc'y v. City of Dayton, 160 Ohio St. 114, 124, 114
N.E.2d 219, 224 (1953). For a definition of "vagueness," see Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (meaning "men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning").
Licensing and discretionary functions continue to be a source of controversy in solicitation litiga-
tion. The major unresolved issues include whether local governments should allow solicitation by
persons convicted of a felony, the appropriate duration of solicitation permits, police investigations
of permit applicants, and the appropriate criteria for revocation of a permit. For a discussion of
licensing issues in solicitation, see International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. City of Houston,
689 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1982); see also McMurdie v. Doutt, 468 F. Supp. 766, 776-77 (N.D. Ohio
1979); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Village of Elm Grove, 462 F. Supp. 820, 823-24 (E.D. Wis.
1978).
61. See Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984) (prohibition of solicitation
by organizations whose expenses exceeded 25% of funds raised invalid); Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 635-38 (1980) (prohibition of solicitation by organizations
that do not use 75% of funds raised for charitable purposes invalid). The Munson Court reasoned
that the prohibition of costly solicitation was not necessary to advance the government's legitimate
interest in preventing fraud, 104 S. Ct. at 2852-53, and disregarded the ordinance's waiver-for-good-
cause provision. Id. In Schaumburg, the Court found that the prohibition was equivalent to a
regulation of speech content, as political advocacy groups are less likely to have volunteer solicitors
than nonpolitical groups. 444 U.S. at 636-37. In addition, the 75% rule failed to advance the gov-
ernment's legitimate interest in preventing fraudulent solicitation, crime, and annoyance. Id. at 636-
39. The Schaumburg Court carefully distinguished National Found. v. City of Fort Worth, 415 F.2d
41 (5th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970), in which the Fifth Circuit upheld a similar
80% rule that permitted any organization to obtain a permit upon demonstrating that its solicitation
costs were reasonable. 444 U.S. at 635 n.9.
62. See Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839, 2852-53 (1984) (discussing
Schaumburg); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980); Hynes
v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-49
(1943).
63. See Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619 (1976); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 146-49 (1943). Intrusive door-to-door solicitations may impose undue annoyance and
impinge upon the homeowner's privacy interest. Id. at 146-49; cf. Haiman, supra note 48, at 193
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solicitation regulations.
B. Hours Regulation
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutionality
of local ordinances restricting door-to-door solicitation to specific hours
of the day, several lower courts have considered the issue. Several courts
have passed over the hours regulation and invalidated ordinances be-
cause of the broad exceptions for various classes of solicitors.65 These
courts have reasoned that numerous exceptions prevent solicitation ordi-
nances from serving stated governmental purposes because the excepted
solicitors will continue to annoy homeowners and pose threats to the se-
curity of the community.66
In Citizens for a Better Environment v. Village of Olympia Fields,67 the
court invalidated an ordinance that restricted door-to-door solicitation to
(local governments should protect unreceptive citizens from "continued bombardment" of un-
solicted information). In ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1983), however, the
Eighth Circuit refused to characterize the homeowner as a "captive audience." Id. at 819; see infra
notes 112-14 and accompanying text (discussing "captive audience" analogy). Unlike the annoyed
homeowner in Kovacs subjected to sound from amplification trucks, see supra notes 45-59 and ac-
companying text, the homeowner confronted with the intrusion of door-to-door solicitors has a
choice-posting a "no solicitation" sign. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Village of Olympia
Fields, 511 F. Supp. 104, 107 (N.D. Ill. 1980). The homeowner may specify certain hours when he
does not want to receive solicitors or may instruct solicitors to call first for permission. See infra
note 117 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of "no solicitation"
signs). Homeowners, however, may be unaware of this option, and solicitors may not honor the
signs.
64. See Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839, 2849-50 (1984); Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425
U.S. 610, 619 (1976); see also ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 817-18 (8th Cir. 1983);
Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862, 871 (N.D. Ga. 1979); American Cancer Soc'y v.
City of Dayton, 160 Ohio St. 114, 124, 114 N.E.2d 219, 224 (1953). These cases address the possibil-
ity that criminals may pose as nighttime solicitors and defraud homeowners.
65. See Pennsylvania Pub. Interest v. York Township, 569 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (M.D. Pa.
1983) (exceptions for farmers selling their own produce, people selling goods donated by owners,
people selling bread, meat, milk and milk-related products, people who pay license tax at chief place
of business and sell goods by showing samples, and authorized insurance brokers); Connecticut Citi-
zens Action Group v. Town of Southington, 508 F. Supp. 43, 47 (D. Conn. 1980) (exception for ice
cream vendors); Alternatives for Cal. Women, Inc. v. County of Contra Costa, 145 Cal. App. 3d
436, 450, 193 Cal. Rptr. 384, 393 (1983) (exception for solicitors not asking for funds or selling
products).
66. Numerous solicitation exceptions are contrary to the government's interests in preventing
crime and protecting the privacy of its citizens. A commercial solicitor may disturb a homeowner's
privacy as effectively as a charitable solicitor. Furthermore, a homeowner may not be able to distin-
guish between an excepted solicitor and a criminal solicitor.
67. 511 F. Supp. 104 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
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daylight hours.6 8 The court reasoned that the interests of homeowners
who wished to hear solicitors' messages during evening hours out-
weighed the interests of homeowners who did not.69 The court noted
that this latter group of homeowners could post "no solicitation" signs. 70
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Association of Community Or-
ganizations for Reform Now (ACORN) v. City of Frontenac,71 held that an
ordinance limiting solicitation to the hours between 9:00 a.m. and 6:00
p.m. was too restrictive. The court extended the permissible hours of
solicitation to 9:00 p.m..72 The court found the government's interest in
preventing crime to be legitimate but concluded that the hours restriction
was unnecessarily broad.73 The court noted that less intrusive alterna-
tives such as requiring permit applications and solicitor identification,
enforcing penal ordinances, and posting "no solicitation" signs could
achieve the same end of preventing crime.74
A few courts have upheld ordinances limiting solicitation to daylight
hours." In Westfall v. Board of Commissioners,76 the court held that the
daylight ordinance was a reasonable means of preventing crime because
the darkness of night facilitates criminal activity.77 The court found that
a selection of specific hours of regulation, while arbitrary, is necessary to
avoid vagueness.7" In addition, the court noted that solicitors may reach
68. Id. at 108. The ordinance limited door-to-door solicitation to the time between 9:00 a.m.
and some hour between 4:00 p.m. and sunset, allowing variations for daylight savings time. Id. at
105.
69. Id. at 107.
70. Id. A solicitor who ignores a "no soliciting" sign is subject to a suit in trespass. See, e.g.,
Hall v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 72, 76-77, 49 S.E.2d 369, 371, appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 875
(1948).
71. 714 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1983).
72. Id. at 818.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 818-19. Other courts have suggested these less restrictive alternatives. See Citizens
for a Better Env't v. Village of Olympia Fields, 511 F. Supp. 104, 107 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Connecticut
Citizens Action Group v. Town of Southington, 508 F. Supp. 43, 46 (D. Conn. 1980); Alternatives
for Cal. Women, Inc. v. County of Contra Costa, 145 Cal. App. 3d 436, 449-50, 193 Cal. Rptr. 384,
392-93 (1983).
75. See Pennsylvania Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Council of Borough of Munhall, 743 F.2d
182 (3d Cir. 1984); Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ga. 1979); McMurdie v.
Doutt, 468 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
76. 477 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
77. Id. at 865. Courts generally require a showing of a factual nexus between nighttime and
crime related to soliciting. See, eg., Pennsylvania Pub. Interest v. York Township, 569 F. Supp.
1355, 1402 (1983); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Village of Olympia Fields, 511 F. Supp. 104, 106-07
(1980).
78. 477 F Supp. at 865-66; see supra note 60 (defining "vagueness").
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people not at home during the permissible time period by soliciting on
weekends and in public places during the week.79 Similarly, in Penn-
sylvania Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Council of Borough of Munhall,0
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an ordinance prohibiting
door-to-door solicitation after 6:00 p.m., finding that it served a signifi-
cant government interest and left open alternative channels of communi-
cation without regulating the content of speech."1
The foregoing cases highlight the points of controversy that arise
whenever a local government attempts to regulate the hours of door-to-
door solicitation. Solicitors oppose daylight ordinances because they
deny access to the broader audience available at night.82 Local govern-
ments support daylight ordinances because they prevent solicitors from
annoying homeowners 3 and prevent criminals from masquerading as so-
licitors at night.
III. RECONCILING THE INTERESTS OF CITY, HOMEOWNER,
AND SOLICITOR
A. Nature of the Forum
The principal dispute in door-to-door solicitation decisions concerns
the classification of the residential doorway as public or private.84 Some
courts have characterized the doorway as a public forum85 for the ex-
79. 477 F. Supp. at 865-66; see also McMurdie v. Doutt, 468 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Ohio 1979)
(upholding without explanation a daylight ordinance). But see Citizens for a Better Env't v. Village
of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (regulation of door-to-door solicitation invalid in the absence of
suitable alternatives); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (city cannot prohibit door-to-
door solicitation).
80. 743 F.2d 182 (3d Cir. 1984).
81. Id. at 185-87; see infra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
82. Most courts acknowledge that solicitors can contact more people in the evening. See, eg.,
cases cited supra note 65. But see Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ga. 1979)
(observing that public and weekend solicitation provides access to larger audience).
83. Courts generally reject the argument that the government's interest in preventing annoy-
ance of its citizens alone justifies regulation of door-to-door solicitation, as the individual homeowner
may protect his privacy by posting a "no solicitation" sign. See infra note 117 and accompanying
text (discussing homeowner privacy and "no solicitation" signs).
84. Compare, e.g., ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 816 (8th Cir. 1983) (doorway
as public forum) with Pennsylvania Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Borough of Munhall, 743 F.2d
182, 186-87 (3d Cir. 1984) (doorway as private forum). Courts have recognized the unique character
of the residential doorway. See, eg., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S.
620, 632 (1980); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 164 (1943).
85. A "public forum" is a place where citizens may assemble and express their views. G. GUN-
THER, CASES AND MATERIALS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1195-96 (10th ed. 1981); cf Hague v.
Washington University Open Scholarship
82 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 63:71
change of ideas.86 These courts have focused upon whether regulation of
door-to-door solicitation unreasonably restricts free speech or discrimi-
nates on the basis of the content of the speech.17 In either event, the
court will invalidate the ordinance as violative of the first amendment. 88
Characterization of the residential doorway as a public forum appears
inappropriate. The normal activity of a public forum consists of public
communication and assembly.89 The private doorway, however, is not
the scene of either activity.90 A homeowner may exclude the public at
any time and for any reason. Although certainly a forum for discussion
and idea exchange, the doorway is not usually accessible to the public.9
Two recent decisions challenge the propriety of applying traditional
public forum analysis to regulation of door-to-door solicitation. In Mem-
bers of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,92 the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a city ordinance prohibit-
ing the posting of signs on public property.93 The Court refused to find
that the ordinance regulated a public forum94 and accordingly did not
apply the stringent "least restrictive means" test, which is appropriate in
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (recognizing that "streets and parks. . . have been immemorially
held in trust for the use of public and. . . have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts about citizens, and discussing public questions"). "Traditional public forum property oc-
cupies a special position in terms of first amendment protection." United States v. Grace, 103 S. Ct.
1702, 1708 (1983).
86. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980); see also
Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 625 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); ACORN v. City of
Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 816 (8th Cir. 1983).
87. See, eg., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 658
(1981) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68
(1981); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
88. See, eg., Pennsylvania Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Borough of Munhall, 743 F.2d 182,
185-86 (3d Cir. 1984).
89. See supra note 85.
90. The normal functions of a doorway include providing the means for entering and exiting
the home, alerting the owner when guests have arrived, and providing a safe and effective barrier
from unwelcome intruders.
91. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980); Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-46 (1943).
92. 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
93. Id. at 2128-36.
94. Id. at 2133-34. The Court observed that the first amendment does not guarantee public
access to all government property. Id. at 2134 (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civ.
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981)). Rather, the government may reserve for its own use all public
property that is not "by tradition or designation a forum for public communication. ... Id. See
supra note 85 (defining "public forum").
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss1/4
Number 1] DOOR-TO-DOOR SOLICITATION
much first amendment analysis.95 Instead, the Court characterized the
ordinance as "viewpoint neutral"96 and inquired into whether there were
"alternative channels of communication" available under the
ordinance.97
In Pennsylvania Alliance For Jobs & Energy v. Council of Borough of
Munhall,98 the Third Circuit applied the "ample alternative channels"
standard to daylight solicitation ordinances.99 A charitable organization
employing door-to-door canvassing techniques contended that door-to-
door solicitation is a "traditional public forum" requiring the "least re-
strictive" form of regulation."t ° The court rejected this argument, con-
cluding that time, place, and manner regulations that are "viewpoint
neutral" regulate the forum for the speech, not the speech itself.," The
Third Circuit held that courts should only apply the least restrictive
methods test to regulations of speech content or public forums."0 2 The
court upheld the ordinance because it did not refer to the content of the
solicitor's speech,"0 3 served a significant government interest,"° and left
95. 104 S. Ct. at 2133-34. The least restrictive means test requires that an ordinance accom-
plish its objectives in the narrowest fashion and with the utmost specificity. See, eg., Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
96. 104 S. Ct. at 2128-29. "The text of the ordinance is neutral-indeed it is silent--concerning
any speaker's point of view .. " Id. at 2128. "Viewpoint neutral" ordinances do not discriminate
on the basis of the content of speech. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981); Pennsylvania Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Borough of Munhal, 743 F.2d
182, 185-86 (3d Cir. 1984).
97. 104 S. Ct. at 2123-34 (quoting Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981)). The Court found that personal solicitation and the distribution of litera-
ture were adequate forms of communication. 104 S. Ct. at 2133.
98. 743 F.2d 182 (3d Cir. 1984).
99. Id. at 185.
100. Id. at 186.
101. Id. Previous door-to-door solicitation decisions focused entirely on the effect of the regula-
tion on the content of the solicitor's speech, rather than the forum. See, eg., Village of Schaumburg
v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610,
625-26 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 816 (8th Cir.
1983); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Village of Olympia Fields, 511 F. Supp. 104, 106 (N.D. Ill.
1980). The only decision other than Munhall to find that an hours ordinance regulated the forum is
Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862 (1979) (upholding daylight ordinances that permit-
ted solicitation from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. as a reasonable government regulation to protect the
privacy and safety of its citizens).
102. 743 F.2d at 185; see supra note 95 (describing least restrictive method test).
103. 743 F.2d at 185. Judge Becker, in dissent, rejected the majority's contention that the ordi-
nances were "viewpoint neutral," asserting that numerous exceptions rendered the ordinances dis-
criminatory and thus "patently viewpoint based." Id. at 191-92 (Becker, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 187-88. The ordinances serve a significant governmental interest in protecting resi-
dents against crime and undue annoyance. Id. The dissent pointed out, however, that many of the
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open "adequate alternative channels of communication."105
The adoption of the "ample alternative forums" test is a significant
and logical development in door-to-door solicitation law. The Munhall
court recognized that the government's intention in enacting regulations
governing door-to-door solicitation is to protect the security and privacy
of its citizens rather than to regulate the content of its citizens' speech. 0 6
Alternative times and places for solicitation provide the access necessary
to ensure that regulation of door-to-door solicitation does not unduly re-
strict free speech in a private forum. Courts must still decide, however,
whether "alternative forums" actually afford the solicitor access to a sig-
nificant audience.
B. Community's Interest in Homeowner Privacy
Local regulation of door-to-door solicitation often reflects the commu-
nity's collective judgment that individual freedom to choose whether or
not to receive a solicitor's message does not adequately protect home-
owner privacy. The Supreme Court has recognized as legitimate a city's
interest in protecting homeowners from unreasonable intrusions upon
their privacy. 107 The right to privacy in one's home is fundamental'0 8
and increases in the evening hours.'0 9
The solicitor's first amendment rights must yield whenever they con-
ordinances in question allowed commercial speech during prohibited hours, thereby destroying any
privacy the residents might have had. Id. at 190-91 (Becker, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissent
noted that the town did not establish any factual connection between solicitation and crime. Id.
105. Id. at 187-88. The court concluded that daylight hours, Saturdays, and public solicitation
provided ample alternative forums for solicitors to reach their audience, although it did not cite any
evidence in support of its conclusion. Id. at 188. The dissent agreed on the "alternative forums"
standard but found that the town did not demonstrate that the proffered alternatives were satisfac-
tory. Id. at 193-95 (Becker, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 186-87; see supra note 101 and accompanying text; cf. Members of City Council of
Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2132 (1984) (ordinance "responds precisely
to the substantive problem which legitimately concerns the city" and "curtails no more speech than
is necessary to accomplish its purposes").
107. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144 (1943). In Martin, the Court stated that
consistent callers, whether peddling merchandise or soliciting funds, may impose a significant bur-
den on the peaceful enjoyment of one's home and may be subject to reasonable regulation to prevent
undue annoyance. Id.
108. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
483-86 (1965).
109. See, eg., Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("No
expectation of privacy [is]. . .more demanding of constitutional prosecution than our right to. ..
be let alone in the privacy of our homes during the night.")
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flict with the homeowner's privacy rights."' In a public forum, inter-
ested people can seek or avoid the solicitor's message according to
choice."' Door-to-door solicitation, in contrast, forces the unreceptive
homeowner to engage in an exchange of information. The homeowner is
a "captive audience"' " 2 and must persuade the solicitor that he is not
interested in receiving the solicitor's message." 3  Most unreceptive
homeowers will not break social etiquette and habit by closing their door
and turning away unwanted solicitors."'
Courts must also consider the individual homeowner's first amend-
ment right to receive information in judging the constitutionality of ordi-
nances restricting door-to-door solicitation.' 15 Some homeowners may
welcome solicitation during the evening and others may desire the
information at any time." 6 Homeowners who do not wish to receive
unsolicited information may post "no solicitation" signs." 7 Thus, the
110. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425
U.S. 610, 619 (1976); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't., 397 U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970).
111. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 653-54 (1981).
112. Courts formulated the captive audience doctrine to protect unwilling and unreceptive lis-
teners from invasive speech. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949). In applying this
doctrine, courts have considered the extent of the listener's voluntary action, the type of communica-
tion (visual or audible), and the listener's inability to escape from message. See, e.g., ACORN v.
City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1983) (rejecting captive audience theory).
113. But cf. infra note 117 and accompanying text ("no solicitation" signs may not be successful
in fending off unwanted solicitation).
114. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949). Door-to-door solicitation would disap-
pear if homeowners could disregard every stranger at their door. Most homeowners will not only
answer the door, but will listen to the speaker's message in its entirety. Solicitation remains an
effective method of conveying information because the homeowner's only defense, closing the door,
seems impolite.
115. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Village of Olympia Fields, 511 F. Supp. 104, 107 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
116. Id. In judging the validity of a solicitation ordinance, courts should consider demographic
statistics of the city, including the median age, the number of children, the number of retired people,
the percentage of people living in the city that actually work in the city, and the percentage of
households in which both spouses work. These statistics should assist courts in determining the
number of homes that contain residents before 6:00 p.m. and should reveal the existence, if any, of
alternative forums for solicitation. In ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 541 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Mo.
1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1983), the city of Frontenac, Missouri, offered demographic
statistics concerning its topography and police force. See infra note 131.
117. See ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1983). "No solicitation"
signs have several disadvantages that may deter homeowners from posting them. A sign may not
afford sufficient flexibility to the homeowner who welcomes solicitors during certain hours. A "no
solicitation after 6:00 p.m." sign, for example, may cure this defect. In addition, homeowners may
want to receive certain classes of solicitors, such as representatives from their local church or club,
girl scouts selling cookies, or local political candidates advocating their platform. While an advance
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community's interest in protecting homeowner privacy, while legitimate,
alone does not justify an ordinance restricting the first amendment rights
of homeowners and solicitors.
C. Community's Interest in Crime Prevention
A second, more compelling reason for upholding a daylight ordinance
is the community's interest in preventing crime. Under its police power,
a city may regulate its streets to protect the welfare and safety of its
citizens." 8 The city's interest in crime prevention increases at night,
when serious crimes occur more frequently.' 19 A daylight ordinance ad-
vances the city's crime prevention interest by reducing the number of
people on its streets after dark.'
A few courts have held that a local government's interest in preventing
crime does not justify regulation of solicitation between 6:00 p.m. and
9:00 p.m.. 1' These courts have concluded that because a city allows
telephone call for permission may solve this problem, it is time consuming and expensive for the
solicitor, annoying to unreceptive homeowners, and may discourage potential donations from inter-
ested persons.
The Eighth Circuit's suggestion that homeowners post "no solicitation" signs raises interesting
state action questions. After the decision in ACORN, Frontenac's mayor Morgan Lawton sent a
letter to every household, explaining the Eighth Circuit's ruling and recommending that they post
"no solicitation" signs in their doorways. A city's interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens
may justify other responses. The city may offer to provide signs free of charge at city hall or may
mail a sign to every home with an accompanying letter of explanation. As a fourth response, the city
may maintain a list of those homeowners who do not want to receive solicitors. This option would
alleviate the problem of posting an unfriendly sign to the world and would allow solicitors to save
time by only speaking to receptive listeners. Finally, a city may maintain a list of residents who do
not want solicitors calling at their door after a certain hour. This response would protect the privacy
interests of homeowners during the evening and permit homeowners to receive solicitors at a conve-
nient time. This option does not place an absolute bar on solicitation and provides homeowners with
a choice in receiving solicitors. There may be many homeowners who do not mind having solicitors
come to their door, but do not want them intruding at an unreasonable hour.
118. See, eg., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980);
Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1976); ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d
813, 817 (8th Cir. 1983).
119. See Pennsylvania Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Borough of Munhall, 743 F.2d 182, 187 (3d
Cir. 1984); Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862, 865 (N.D. Ga. 1979). But see Penn-
sylvania Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Borough of Munhall, 743 F.2d 182, 190 (3d Cir. 1984)
(Becker, J., dissenting) ("undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to over-
come the right to freedom of expression") (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
120. See Pennsylvania Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Borough of Munhall, 743 F.2d 182, 184 (3d
Cir. 1984); Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862, 866 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
121. See ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1983); Pennsylvania Pub. Interest
v. York Township, 569 F. Supp. 1398 (M.D. Pa. 1983); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Village of
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solicitors to canvass from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., it cannot deprive the
solicitors of that right from 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m..' 2 2 This rationale de-
rives from the "appropriate places" test adopted in Schneider v. Town of
Irvington.'23 In Schneider, the Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance
prohibiting the distribution of literature in streets and alleys because the
ordinance permitted distribution in other public areas.' 24 The Court
characterized streets and alleys as "appropriate places" for first amend-
ment activities.125 In applying the "appropriate places" doctrine to
daylight ordinances, however, courts have committed a fundamental
error.
These courts have equated "appropriate places" with "appropriate
hours."' 26 This construction ignores the increase in the city's interest in
the prevention of crime at night. Daylight ordinances prohibit solicita-
tion when the nature of the residential doorway changes from a daytime
forum for the public exchange of information to a nighttime barrier
against the world guarding the privacy of the occupant.
127
The Eighth Circuit recently employed a "least restrictive means" anal-
ysis 2 ' to invalidate a daylight ordinance in Association of Community
Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) v. City of Frontenac.2 9 The
Eighth Circuit recognized a city's legitimate interest in preventing
crime' 30 but found that limiting solicitation to daylight hours was not the
least restrictive means of accomplishing that goal.' ACORN is thus
Olympia Fields, 511 F. Supp. 104 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Connecticut Citizens Action Group v. Town of
Southington, 508 F. Supp. 43 (D. Conn. 1980); Alternatives for Cal. Women v. County of Contra
Costa, 145 Cal. App. 3d 450, 193 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1983).
122. See, e.g., ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 819-20 (8th Cir. 1983). The city of
Frontenac, Missouri argued unsuccessfully that the daylight hours of 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on
weekdays and Saturdays provide an adequate forum for solicitors to contact their audiences and for
residents to receive the solicitor message. Id. at 819.
123. 308 U.S. 147 (1939); see supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing Schneider).
124. 308 U.S. at 163.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1983).
127. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (right to privacy in one's home increases at
night).
128. See supra note 95 (discussing least restrictive means test).
129. 714 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1983); see supra note 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing
ACORN).
130. 714 F.2d at 818.
131. Id. at 819-19. The drafters of the ordinance considered many factors peculiar to Frontenac.
Every house is on a lot of one acre or more, and many houses are set back as much as 100 feet from
the street. This zoning scheme hinders the police in detecting intruders on private property at night.
This situation is compounded by the absence of street lights and sidewalks. The drafters of the
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inconsistent with Pennsylvania Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Council of
Borough of Munhall,1 32 in which the Third Circuit explicitly refused to
adopt the least restrictive means test in its consideration of a daylight
ordinance.133 The Eighth Circuit suggested the use of three less restric-
tive alternatives: enforcing trespass and burglary laws; implementing ap-
plication and identification procedures; and posting "no solicitation"
signs. 134 Upon close examination, each suggested alternative fails to ad-
vance the city's interest in preventing crime as effectively as a daylight
ordinance.
Trespass and burglary laws will not deter a burglar posing as a solici-
tor who knows that his actions are illegal. In contrast, a prohibition on
evening solicitation puts homeowners and police officers on notice that
people travelling from house to house at night are probably not engaged
in legitimate activity. Similarly, enforcement of application and identifi-
cation procedures will not significantly advance a city's crime prevention
interests. Few criminals will apply for a solicitation license, and most
homeowners will be unaware that solicitors must carry city-approved
identification cards. Finally, while "no solicitation" signs may protect
individual privacy, '35 they will not prevent crime, which is a community
problem. As long as the neighborhood remains open to solicitors, night-
fall will not create notice of probable illegality. Thus, a city's interest in
crime prevention justifies ordinances restricting solicitation to daylight
hours.
IV. CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of daylight ordinances is uncertain. The
Supreme Court has never addressed this issue, and lower federal courts
have reached inconsistent results. The solicitor's first amendment right
to free speech and the homeowner's right to receive information often
conflict with the community's interest in preventing crime and annoy-
ordinance also considered the number of police officers on patrol at any one time. Record at 5974,
ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 741 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1983).
132. 743 F.2d 182 (3d Cir. 1984); see supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text (discussing
Munhall).
133. 743 F.2d at 185-86; see also Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2133-34 (1984) (rejecting application of least restrictive means test for
"viewpoint neutral" regulation); supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text (discussing Vincent).
134. 714 F.2d at 818-19.
135. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing "no solicitation" signs).
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ance and protecting homeowner privacy. Courts have struggled to bal-
ance the competing interests of city, homeowner, and solicitor.
Courts should apply the "ample alternative forums" test, because it
respects both the solicitor's right to reach an audience and the city's right
to protect its citizens. The viability of an alternative forum depends on
empirical and demographic evidence of the city and its residents to en-
sure that the alternative forum provides access to a significant audience.
Sundown ordinances are the best solution. An ordinance permitting
door-to-door solicitation during daylight hours maximizes the amount of
daylight time available for solicitation and provides necessary "ample al-
ternatives."'13 6 A prohibition of solicitation after dark protects the city's
interest in preventing crime and undue annoyance. Local governments
should avoid possible vagueness problems 3 7 by varying the hours of a
solicitation ordinance to coincide with the time of sundown.
Howard B. Altman
136. See Pennsylvania Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Borough of Munhall, 743 F.2d 182, 184
n 2. 190 n.4 (3d Cir. 1984).
137. See Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 861, 866 (N.D. Ga. 1979); see also supra
note 60 (defining "vagueness").
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